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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A. FRED FLEMING,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.FLEMING FELT COMPANY, a
corporation, and JOSEPH H.
FELT and MARIE FEL'r,
Defendants and Appellants.

I
I

Case
No. 8732

APPELLANTS' PETITION
FOR REHEARING
The appellants, Fleming Felt Company, a corporation, and :Marie Felt, petition the Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cause, the Court by its opinion
filed March 31, 1958, having affirmed, with modification,
the judgment of the trial court.

:;~wON,_ ~1

-- IL!,AN & RICHARDS

720 Newhouse Building
Salt L.·ak~7City,J]tah

//~~·/_4 (- /)'~·

--·----------------··---·---~-··---------- . ·---------...... f{. .................................................... .

Harold R. Boyer
1409 Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defenda;nts and Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A. FRED FLEMING,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.FLEl\fiNG FELT COMPANY, a
corporation, and JOSEPH H.
FELT and ~IARIE FELT,
Defendants an.d Appellants.

Case
No. 8732

APPELLANTS' BRIEF IX SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

PorNT No. 1

THE COrRT HAS APPLIED A.N INCORRECT
:\IE.A.SrRE OF DA:JIAGE
This Court has determined on appeal that the evidence in the record supports the finding of the trial court
to the effect that the Felts breached their contract with
FlL'ming, then'h~· entitling Fleming to damages. Fleming- wns awarded dnmages in the sum of $13,512.00, which,
as tJw (\nut says, .. is the yalue of the inventory he had
put into the hnsi1w~~." In thi~ determination the Court
Jws ig-nort>d the nwa~ure of damages which the law has
Pstn hlished for hrenrl1 of contract.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This Court has apparently adopted the theory that
the measure of damage is what Fleming put into the
business. To award Fleming the value of his original
inventory completely ignores the increase or decrease in
the value of his share in the business from the time of
merger to the date of the breach.
The business was operated from August 31, 1953, to
June, 1955, under the management of Fleming. Assume
there had been a substantial growth in the business during this period. Should not Fleming have the benefit of
the proportionate increase in value of his interest and
recover substantially more than $13,512? On the other
hand, suppose that because of his mismanagement, or
due to some other factor not the fault of the Felts, the
value of the business declined, resulting in a proportionate decrease in the value of Fleming's interest in the
business at the time of the breach. In such case should
the Felts be required to bear the whole burden thereof~
Obviously not, and that there was in fact a substantial
loss prior to the breach is no mere supposition. The
only financial statement admitted in evidence shows that
there had been a substantial impairment of capital. Tht>
business was losing money long prior to the breach. ~x
hibit 12-P (R. 265).
The adoption of the value of Fleming's original inventory, $13,512, as a measure of damage is arhitra ry and
substitutes convenience of calculation for justirc~ and
equity.
3
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It is submitted that under the circumstances of this
case the proper measure of damage is to allow Fleming
the value of his interest in the business as of the date of
the breach, not the value of his inventory nearly two years
earlier. He should be allowed the same proportion of the
inventory at the time of the breach as his original inventory was of the total original inventory.
There is no evidence that the parties made any contributions to capital other than their original inventories,
nor is there any claim that either of the parties failed to
obtain salary or dividends to which he was entitled. Thus,
an award of damages based upon a principle which allows
Fleming his proportionate value of the inventory at the
time of the breach is fair and equitable.
However, as to the value of Fleming's interest in the
business at the time of the breach there is no evidence
in the record. If Fleming is to prevail he has the burden of proving the amount of his damage. This he has
failed to do. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court
should be reversed, or, in the alternative, if this Court is
of the opinion that Fleming should prevail in spite of
such deficiency in the proof, the case should be remanded
to the trial court to permit the introduction of additional
evidence.
Furthermore, in awarding to Fleming the value of
the inventory he had put into the business, $13,512.00, the
Court has ignored the fact that Fleming received and still
has 13,512 shares of stock in the Fleming Felt Company.
4
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PoiNT No. II.
FLEMING'S DAl\iAGE SHOULD FURTHER
BE REDUCED BY THE VALUE OF HIS 13,512
SHARES OF STOCK OF THE FLEMING
FELT COMPANY.
Appellants contend that if Fleming were to receive
the value of his share of the business at the time of the
breach - or the original value of his inventory for that
matter- such value should be reduced by the value of
the shares of stock still remaining in his hands. The
award of damages as it now stands is inequitable and
unjustly enriches Fleming.
The basic rule governing the measure of damages for
breach of contract is well settled:
''The measure of damages in the case of a
breach of contract is the amount which will compensate the injured person for the loss which a
fulfillment of the contract would have prevented or
the breach of it has entailed. In other words, the
person injured is, so far as it is possible to do so
by a monetary award, to be placed in the position
he would have been in had the contract been performed. Another statement of the rule is that,
where one party to a contract repudiates it, the
other party is entitled to recover the value of the
contract to him at the time of its breach." 25
C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 74, p. 563.
Nor should Fleming be put in a better position by a
recovery of damages for the breach of the contract than
he would have been if there had been performance.
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F. (2d)
5
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49 ( CCA-7, 1955) ; Blair v. United States, 150 F. (2d) 676
( CCA-8, 1945).
Following this well established rule for the determination of damages, the contract should be analyzed to
see what Fleming would have had had the contract been
fulfilled, and then a determination should be made as to
how the breach affected the same.
Turning to the first matter: What would Fleming
have had had the contract been fulfilled~ Basically he
would have had two things: (1) a position as general
manager of the Fleming Felt Company, and (2) 13,512
shares of stock of the company.
Now, the Court has sustained the finding of the trial
court that there has been a breach of the contract, the result being that Fleming has lost his position as general
manager of Fleming Felt Company. But he still has the
13, 512 shares of stock of Fleming Felt Company.
What is the measure of his damage~ As for the first
element the Court has correctly interpreted the record,
'' There was no proof that his wages or income would
have been greater than he received from the Fleming Felt
Corporation during the period; nor that he otherwise
suffered damage.''
As for the second element of his damage, he still has
his 13,512 shares of stock in the company. On this point
he has not been damaged at all unless the breach of the
contract has diminished the Yalue of the shares. Cer6
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tainly there is no evidence in the record of this being the
case. On the other hand, the 13,512 shares were accepted
at the outset as the value of the Fleming merchandise.

It is therefore submitted that since Fleming would
have continued to possess the 13,512 shares of stock of
the Fleming Felt Company if the contract had not been
breached, he should not have more than this upon the
breach.
However, the record is entirely devoid of any evidence of a diminution in the value of the Fleming stock.
The burden of such a showing was Fleming's. The judgment of the trial court should therefore be reversed or,
in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for a determination of the diminution in value, if
any, of Fleming's 13,512 shares of stock by reason of
the breach.
On the other hand, if the Court grants to Fleming
the value of his inventory put into the corporation in August, 1953, or the value of Fleming's interest in the business at the date of the breach, as contended for in Point
~ o. I, then surely, there should be deducted from such
a figure the value of the 13,512 shares of stock of Fleming Felt Company he retains in his possession. Otherwise,
Fleming will be unjustly enriched.
The case of Eastern Terminal Lumber Co. v. Stitzinger, 35 F. (2d) 333 (CCA-3, 1929) followed the correct
rule here contended for. In that case the firm of Stitzinger
& Co. entered into a contract with the Lumber Company
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whereby it became the selling agent for the Lumber Company in designated areas. The contract was to exist for
some ten years, though on this point there was some
dispute. Stitzinger was to receive commissions on sales
of lumber. In addition, Stitzinger was to purchase capital
stock of the Lumber Company to the extent of $15,000 to
$25,000 at par of one hundred dollars per share. In the
course of performance under the contract, Stitzinger subscribed and paid for 150 shares, amounting to $15,000.
Some months after entering into the contract the Lumber
Company canceled the contract and commenced a suit to
recover amounts claimed to be due on certain orders for
lumber, etc. Stitzinger counterclaimed, charging the
Lumber Company with breaching the contract, and sought
to recover damages consisting principally of two items:
(1) anticipated profits, and (2) damages which it suffered
on account of the stock that had been purchased.
It is the second element of damages that is analogous
to the instant case. Stitzinger sought to recover the full
$15,000 that had been paid for the stock, claiming that this
was an element of damage which was suffered on account
of the cancellation of the contract. The Lumber Company
claimed, of course, that no damage was sustained.
It is submitted that the Circuit Court correctly applied the law in disposing of this question. The trial court
entered a directed verdict for the Lumber Company. The
Circuit Court if Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the trial court, and on the point in question said:
8
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I~~.~
I

''rrhey ask damages for the $15,000 which they
were required to spend as an item in the contract
and offer to surrender the stock. What that damage is, if any, is a question for the jury under
proper instructions of the court. When one party
enters upon the performance of a contract and is
prevented from so doing without fault on his part,
one distinct item of damage is his outlay and expenses less the value of the materials on hand, and
it does not lie in the mol).th of the party who has
wrongfully put an end to the contract to say that
the other has not been damaged, at least to the
amount of what he has been induced fairly and
in good faith to lay out and expend, after making
allowance for the material on hand. The outlay
for this stock was made in good faith, without
which the contract would not have been made. It
is now in the nature of so much rna terial in the
hands of the defendants. What the value is should
be decided by the jury in resolving the question
of damages. United States v. Behan, 110 U. S.
338, 345, 4 S. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168; Press Publishing Co. v. Reading News Agency, 44 Pa. Super.
Ct. 428.
"In refusing to submit the questions of damage to the jury, the learned District Judge fell into
error, and the judgment is reversed and a new
trial granted.''
In other situations where the party claiming a breach
of contract has certain property on hand as a fruit of the
contract, the courts have always required that this be
taken into consideration in determining the damages suffered. Bradley v. N evada-Califorwia-Oregon Ry., 178 P.
906 (Nev.1919) ;Spitzerv.Pathe Exchange,23P. (2d) 308
(Cal., 1933); Superior Tube Co. v. Delaware Aircraft In-
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dustries, 60 F. Supp. 573 (Dist. Ct., D. Del. 1945); White
River Levee Dist. v. McWilli(J!ffl;s Dredging Co., 40 F. (2d)
873 (CCA-8, 1930); Moline Furniture Works v. Club
Holding Co.,. 274 N. W., 338 (Mich., 1937); Bremhorst v.
Phillips Coal Co., 211 N. W. 898 (Iowa, 1927) ; Guerini
Stone Co., v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 248 U. S. 334, 63 L.
Ed. 275; United States v. Behan, 110 U. S., 338, 28 L.
Ed.168.
Nor would it be proper to require Fleming to return
his stock to Fleming Felt Company and then grant Fleming the initial value of his merchandise inventory or the
value of his interest in the business. That would be rescission and would not be proper in view of the determination
by this Court that the basis for rescission does not exist.
It is therefore apparent that even the general theory
of damages adopted by the Court requires that rather
than the value of his initial inventory, Fleming be awarded his proportionate interest in the business at the time
of the breach, and that this value be reduced by the value
of the 13,512 shares of stock of Fleming Felt Company
remaining in his hands.
Fleming has also failed in sustaining his burden in
this regard, and the decision of the trial court should be
reversed or, in the alternatiYe, the case should be remanded to the trial court for the determination of (1) the
value of Fleming's interest in the business at the time of
the hn'<teh, and (2) th0 value of Fleming's stock at that
time - Fleming to be awarded the difference.
10
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed or, in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial court for
the purposes herein set forth.

Respectfully submitted,

::~?Ztlil ----~LAN & RICHARDS
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

----~:z~~-21~~--~~-----------------------

Harold R. Boyer
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendwnts and .Appellants
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